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BOOK REVIEWS
Law Finding Through Experience and Reason. By Roscoe Pound.
Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1960. Pp. ix, 65. $2.50.
Roscoe Pound, Dean Emeritus of the Harvard Law School, and one
of the world's great men in the field of jurisprudence, in his ninetieth
year gave three lectures which are printed in this book. The occasion
was the Centennial Celebration of the University of Georgia Law School,
and the lectures were given in February, 1960. The little book would
be noteworthy if for no other reason than that it reflects the views of a
man so eminent, expressed at an age few men attain.
In the first lecture, ertitled "Law Making and Law Finding," Pound
contrasts making particular laws or rules by the exercise of the will of
legislators with the process of finding law in the sense of broader principles. He takes the view that law in the latter sense is developed in
large measure out of ideals combined with experience, and he supports
his position with material taken from his voluminous learning. He
traces the stages through which systems of law have developed and in
so doing summarizes much of the material to be found in his article,
The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, written
in 1914.1 His lecture carries the discussion up to the present.
In the current stage of legal development Pound sees a trend away
from local law and in the direction of universality. Behind such a trend
he points to the increasing commercial unification of the world and the
annihilation of distance by air transportation. In this connection he
argues that we shall have to get rid of the idea that law "is a body of
commands of a political sovereign and that a politically organized worldstate is a necessary prerequisite of a law of the world."
The reviewer believes that this latter statement of Pound's is valid
only within limitations. A commercial law of the world can operate
without a global sovereign to issue rules in the form of commands and
enforce them, but Pound himself in the article referred to above pointed
out that the first objective of law in its earliest stage is to keep the
peace. 2 To date this has been successfully done within particular nations
by law enforced by government but has not been accomplished on an
international scale for lack of any world government capable of enforcing
world law. The present precarious position of the peoples of the earth
should make it plain that global law without an organization to enforce
it falls short of insuring an orderly world.
127 HARV. L. REV. 195.
2Id. at 198.
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In his second lecture, "Stare Decisis," Pound continues his theme
that law is, in considerable measure, found as distinguished from artificially created.- He points out that law never stands still; that along
with stability in a legal order there must be flexibility, a continual overhauling and refitting to the changes in the life*of the society which the
law governs. The apparatus for making this continuous adjustment includes law making by legislation, but it also includes law finding, the
ascertainment of principles by judicial decision and juristic writing.
Pound reviews the juristic position of the neo-Kantians, led by
Rudolph Stammler, and notes the widening gap today between the neoKantians represented by Giorgio Del Vecchio and those represented by
Hans Kelsen.. He also sketches the position of the neo-Hegelians, neoidealists, revived law of nature school of jurists in France, and neorealists. In connection with the latter group he makes an interesting one
paragraph thumbnail sketch of a group of Swedish realists who are
"explaining psychologically law as an aggregate of independent imperatives establishing behavior patterns for those whom a lawmaking authority seeks to influence."
Pound's emphasis, as in his earlier works, remains on sociological
jurisprudence. He states that the sociological jurist of today insists on:
(1) study of the social effects of legal institutions, precepts, and doctrines; (2) study of means of making the precepts effective; (3) psychological study of judicial, administrative, legislative, and juristic
processes; (4) study' of what social effects legal doctrines have produced
in the past, and how; and (5) individualized application of legal precepts looking to reasonable and' just solution of individual cases.
When law is found judicially and is embodied in decisions, stare
decisis introduces stability in that the decisions are followed as precedents. Pound argues, however, that they are not to be followed blindly,
but in the light of changed conditions. He calls attention to cases recognizing stare decisis as "a principle of social policy rather than an inflexible rule of law."
Pound's third lecture is on "Reason and Reasoning in Law Finding."
In it he makes a distinction between reason and reasoning. He criticizes
rigid legal reasoning by analogy and by deduction from fixed conceptions as a means of solving new problems. Such artificial logic brings
law out of accord with reason or reasonableness, which takes account of
the importance of changed conditions. The contrast seems to be one
between law tied to concepts and law geared to human needs and purposes. One of Pound's many illustrations is the linking of restitution
with the concept of contract so that restitution to prevent unjust enrichment was tied to the analogy of recovery on an express promise.

1960]
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These lectures are not closely knit treatments of particular subjects
but broad discussions on a large scale, bringing into play many juristic
points of view. Pound, the profound student of the juristic past, also
remains an observer and participant in the movements and changes of
the present. In this book he brings to bear much of the erudition with
which students of Pound are familiar, and blends witb it a scholar's
appraisal of today's juristic scene.
FRANK HANFT

University of North Carolina
School of Law
Chapel Hill, North Carolina

The Law of Corporations. By Norman D. Lattin. Brooklyn: The
Foundation Press, Inc. 1959. Pp. 613. $8.00.
Professor Lattin's one-volume student text on corporations is the
first of its kind in two decades.' Although his work is more compact
than his predecessors', 2 he has, by eschewing such esoteric subjects as
corporate liability for torts and crimes 3 and the admission and "presence" of foreign corporations, 4 covered most of the area the student will
encounter in the usual law school course on corporations.
Most, but not all, for there are a few serious deficiencies. Four pages
on the federal Securities Act5 are inadequate to deal with the extensive
impact of that act upon corporate flotations. Two pages on the fraud
provisions of Sec. 10(b),6 eight on the "short swing" provisions of Sec.
167 and four on the proxy provisions of Sec. 14(a) 8 of the Securities
Exchange Act do not do justice to that act. Finally, nothing but hornbook tradition can justify the omission of any treatment of debt financing
in a book which devoted more than one hundred pages to pre- and postincorporation stock issues. Debt accounts for 40-45% of all corporate
financing; and outside equity financing represents a small part of the
55-60% remainder, which consists largely of retained earnings and de1
SOLECK,
MODERN CORPORA'ION LAW (student ed. 1960) is a "digest of extracts"
from a five-volume practitioners' treatise designed to demonstrate "the invalid
half-truth" of the hornbook writers' premise "that it is better for a student to learn
much about little than little about much" (p. iii). The premise seems to me to
be unimpaired.

2BALANTINE ON CORPORATIONS (rev. ed. 1946) (992 pages); STEVENS, THE
LAW OF PRrvATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1949) (1125 pages).

'BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 270-282; Stevens, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 355-375.
"STvExs, op. cit supra note 2, 9661018.
'Pp. 126-127, 146-147.
'Pp. 274-276.
Pp. 276-284.
pp. 309-313.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

9

preciation allowances. Except for the few schools which can afford the
luxury of a separate course in corporate finance, the student must learn
What he learns of debt issues in the basic course in corporations.
Space for the treatment of these matters would have been available
had Professor Lattin departed further from the traditional pattern of the
hornbook on corporations. With improved draftsmanship of corporate
articles and frequent legislative attention to the problem, the old ultra
vires doctrine is not of sufficient contemporary importance to warrant
thirty-three pages.' 0 Legislative attention again plus Professor Frey's
exhaustive efforts of a few years ago" leave less that needs to be said
12
about the de facto corporation than will justify twenty-eight pages.
The chapter on choice of business form,' 3 essentially a small business
problem, does not "come off." Tax considerations will usually be controlling and can never be ignored, but a work this size cannot deal adeqiiately with these considerations. The better part of valor would have
been to omit the fifty-nine page chapter and refer the student to the
American Law Institute's two-hundred page pamphlet,' 4 now in the
process of revision.
Within the coverage he undertakes, however, Professor Lattin's
treatment is for the most part unexceptionable. But again the "most"
qualification is necessary, for two reservations must be made.
There are, in the first place, occasional puzzling omissions:
(1) The discussion of the liability of shareholders in undercapitalized corporations reaches the conclusion that innocent and inactive shareholders should not be liable to corporate creditors. This conclusion is
rested on analogy to cases dealing with defectively formed corporations.' 5 No mention is made of the fact that the Supreme Court has
reached the opposite conclusion, that even an innocent shareholder
should be vicariously responsible for the knowing acts of corporate directors. 6 Although this decision is not binding on state courts if the
corporate liability is not federally created, its existence might at least
have been acknowledged.
'See Lintner, Financing of Corporations, in MAsoN, THE CoRoRTION IN
MODERN SociETY 177-181 (1960).
10 Pp. 177-210.
Professor Lattin's own estimate is that "within the next quartercentury the subject of ultra vires will be of historic value only." P. 191.
11 Frey, Legal Analysis And The "De Facto" Doctrine, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1153
(1952).
2 Pp. 148-176.
", Pp. 1-59.

"' SARNER AND METE, ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS OF SMALL BUSINESS

1

(1956).

5 P. 71.
28 Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944), cited on p. 73 for the proposition
that "use of a holding company to avoid a statutory double liability provision placed
upon shareholders in banking corporations [will] not .. . relieve the shareholders
in the holding company from this double liability."
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(2) The entire discussion of underwriting agreements 17 proceeds on
the assumption that the only underwriting arrangement known to man
is the "strict" underwriting of the English type. The student who
would learn of the "firm commitment," more commonly employed in
this country, or of the "best efforts" underwriter must look elsewhere.
(3) The orthodox recital of the duties of the corporate secretary as
"keeper of the corporate records and of the seal"' 8 contains no hint of
the potentialities for mischief inherent in that functionary's authority to
certify both true and false corporate records and to attest both genuine
and spurious signatures of other corporate officials. 19
(4) The treatment 20 of the SEC proxy rule authorizing stockholder
submissions, in management proxy solicitations, of proposals which are
by state law "a proper subject for action by security holders" contains
no reference to the ominously ambiguous 1954 amendment excluding
proposals "relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations"
of the corporation.

21

(5) The discussion 22 of Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows Inc. v. Ringling,23 which held that a stockholders' voting agreement with an arbitration clause is not invalid for failure to comply with
the Delaware voting trust statute, will leave the student vulnerable to
some surprise when he discovers elsewhere Abercrombie v. Davies24
holding that a stockholders' voting agreement with irrevocable proxies
to voting agents and an arbitration clause is invalid under that statute.2,
There is, secondly, an occasional lack of accuracy or precision in
statement which is particularly serious in a work designed for beginning
students:
(1) The statement that the "fiduciary obligation of the majority
shareholders to the minority" will prevent the majority's ratification of
an unfair contract between the corporation and a director 26 does not
describe anything decided in Pepper v. Litton 7 or Zahn v. Transamerica
17

Pp. 123-125.

19

See McMan Oil & Gas Co. v. Hurley, 24 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1928); Condor

18P. 233.

Corp. v. Cunningham, 71 Cal. App. 2d 25, 162 P2d 21 (Dist. Ct. App. 1945);
Holden v. Phelps, 141 Mass. 456, 5 N.E. 815 (1886) ; Commonwealth v. Reading
Savings Bank, 137 Mass. 431 (1884) ; McLain Fuel Corp. v. Lineinger, 341 Pa. 364,
19 A.2d 378 (1941) ; Hutchison v. Rock Hill Real Estate & Loan Co., 65 S.C. 45,
43 S.E. 295 (1902).

Po
p. 309-313.

See Bayne, Caplin, Emerson & Latcham, Proxy Regulation and the Rule-

Making
Process, 40 VA. L. Rav. 387, 428 (1954).
2 pp. 319-320.

Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
A.2d 338 (Del. 1957).
perhaps I am still suffering from an advocate's myopia incurred while
serving with counsel in Abercrombie in support of the unsuccessful argument that
Ringling was controlling.
29
P. 260.
27308 U.S. 295 (1939).
2829

' 130
2. Or
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Corp.,2 which are cited for that proposition. More apt citations are
29
available.
(2) The treatment of noncumulative preferred stock includes, of
course, a discussion of the usual rule that dividends are at the discretion
of the board of directors and completely noncumulative, and of the New
Jersey "dividend credit" rule which treats dividends as cumulative to the
extent earned. But the discussion is preceded by this sentence: "Contrary to cumulative preferred stock, if there was no fund from which
dividends could have been declared in a particular year, such shares may
not later receive that year's dividend from a fund realized at a prior or
later period."8 0 From this statement the unwary student may draw the
negative inference-and at least one of mine has-that cumulative preferred is cumulative only to the extent that there is a "fund from which
dividends could have been declared."
(3) In the discussion of the proposition that dividends may not be
declared out of capital this sentence appears: "The term 'capital' is not
descriptive of any particular assets such as land, buildings, inventory,
cash, etc., but is value in the large sense of value of corporate assets
contributed for permanent use ... and equal ... to the aggregate par
value of shares issued and outstanding plus amounts received (or promised to be paid) through the issue of no-par value shares to the extent
of the amounts which are capitalized, plus other values which have been
added through the capitalization of surpluses .. ."31 This language
invites the novice to conclude that there are two kinds of corporate
assets-those that are "contributed for permanent use" and some other
kind-and that no dividends may be declared unless assets of the former
kind in value equal to the amount of the capital charge are retained.
(4) "And, of course, if net assets must be figured-as they should
be-by including the stated capital items as a liability, the insolvency
test, as adopted in bankruptcy, would bar a dividend except where a
surplus shows up by subtracting liabilities, including stated capital, from
total assets, after deductions have been made for depreciation, bad debts,
etc., which good accounting as well as the law requires. 8' 2 Surely this
implies that the bankruptcy courts, or possibly "good accounting" and
"the law," treat the capital account as a liability account in determining
83
solvency-a proposition equally erroneous in either of its alternatives.
' 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
".

'

See

BAKER AND CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoRPoRATIoNs

ed. unabridged 1959).
80 P.
Pp.439.
467-468.

513-14 (3rd

32P. 469.
"The notion persists with Professor Lattin. Capital "appears as a liabilitya fictitious one for the corporation is not bound to pay it . . . ." (p. 470). Some
courts, in determining the proper source of dividends, have "applied an income
test rather than one which balances assets against liabilities including stated capital ...

..

(p. 471).
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(5) After presenting the argument against treating unrealized appreciation either as an asset or as a loss-offset for purposes of declaring
cash dividends, Professor Lattin suggests that, "Stock dividends permitted by a number of statutes are relatively harmless for they take
nothing from creditors or shareholders."3 4 But the shareholder in a
corporation which issues a stock dividend, with a corresponding increase
in its capital charge, against an unrealized appreciation which later
evaporates, might find some cause to dispute this statement as he contemplates his future dividend prospects.
(6) In discussing the problem of stock valuation under an appraisal
statute, Professor Lattin says that, "market value, where there is a free
and open market 'and the volume of trading in the share is such as to
constitute a fair reflection of the buying and selling public's judgment, is
entitled to much weight. The New York court seems eventually to have
concluded that market value is a controlling (but not the only) consideration where the market is as stated above." 35 What is a controlling
consideration which is not the only consideration? Logic suggests that
it is a non-controlling consideration. So does the New York case cited,3 6
if the opinion is taken at face value. It does say that market value is
"controlling" where the market is free and open and the volume of trading is substantial, but it says also that the appraisers may test the market
value by earnings, dividends, book value and the market value of comparable securities. The opinion may mean that the market value, tested
by other indications of value, is controlling, or it may mean that the court
is willing to allow apprai.ers to treat market value as controlling but will
insist that they make a pretense of considering other value indicators.
It cannot mean that market value is controlling but not controlling.
With these numerous caveats, this book seems to me the best onevolume text for student use, ' and not merely because it covers developments of the last twenty years. Professor Lattin conveys, much better
than his predecessors have done, the vital information that the solution
of a vast number of legal problems relating to corporations does not rest
upon a "common law" of corporations but upon an interpretation of
articles, by-laws, share certificates, resolutions and other corporate documents. He brings to many of these problems, moreover, a commonsense approach and a pungent comment which lay bare some judicial
fallacies. Thus, of the hoary notion that creditors of a corporation rely
upon the "capital stock" of the corporation in extending credit:
"1P. 479.
' P. 528.
Application of Marcus, 273 App. Div. 725, 79 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1948), which
holds only that the stockholder is not entitled to subpoena all of the company's
financial books and records to establish that book values were too low because the
company followed the accepted practice of carrying fixed assets at cost and inventories at the lower of cost or market.
"' Which suggests my first use for reprints of a book review.
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It seems like pretty high nonsense to assume that business men in
giving credit rely that much upon the amount of capital stock set
forth in articles or in balance sheets and, if they did, to conclude
that they further assume that the figure will always remain the
same until they are notified otherwise. They are much more interested in liquid assets and current liabilities, credit ratings and
previous paying experience
than in any statement of the com38
pany's capital stock.
And, of cases suggesting that directors should be liable only for their
"gross negligence":
Any court taking such a view has a heart too tender for the hardheaded business men who usually sit upon boards of directors.
There is no valid reason why directors should not pay sufficient
attention to the business of the corporations upon whose boards
they sit so that they will qualify under [more strict tests] .... If
they cannot pay that much attention to the corporate business, they
should not be sitting upon the board.39
In a field too long dominated by conceptualism, Professor Lattin's
approach is welcome.

VERN COUNTRYMAN
Dean and Professor of Law
University of New Mexico School of Law
81P. 121.
'1

P. 243.

